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PROTECTING RELIGIOUS SPEAKERS' ACCESS TO
PUBLIC SCHOOL FACILITIES: LAMB'S CHAPEL V.
CENTER MORICHES SCHOOL DISTRICT

I. INTRODUCTION
In numerous instances in the past, schools and courts have
demonstrated a great deal of hostility toward religion in general
and toward Christianity in particular.' Recently, however, the Supreme Court took a significant step toward ending such bias. In
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District,2 the Supreme
Court ruled that school districts may not prohibit the use of their
facilities by religious organizations when other groups are permitted
to use the facilities under similar circumstances.3 Lamb's Chapel is
important because it applies the concept of equal access to private
groups, expanding prior decisions which held that students wishing
to engage in religious speech could not be denied access to school
facilities based upon the content of their beliefs.4 The Court also
began moving toward the reversal of a long trend of judicial bias
against religion that has resulted in a number of decisions adverse
to persons seeking to express religious viewpoints in the public
schools.5 Finally, the decision in Lamb's Chapel provides a power-

1. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
2. 113 S.CL 2141 (1993).
3. Id. at 2147.
4. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (upholding Congressional guarantees of equal access); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (requiring
universities to provide equal access to religious student groups).
5. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text. See generally Frederick M. -Gedicks,
Essay, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 681 (1992) ("The privileging of secular knowledge in public life as objective and the marginalizing of religious
belief in private life as subjective has been a foundational premise of American jurisprudence under the Religion Clause of the First Amendment."); see also George W. Dent,
Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 864, 868 (1988) ("[S]everal
studies buttress the [contention] that the public school curriculum is systematically biased
against Protestant Christianity.").
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ful new weapon for pro-Christian legal advocacy groups, most
notably the American Center for Law and Justice, that seek to
strengthen the rights of religious speakers through litigation in the
courts.6

II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing the Lamb's Chapel decision, it is important
to review prior decisions dealing with similar first amendment
issues.7 In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court handed down
a number of decisions limiting religious activities in the public
schools,' pursuant to the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 9 At the same time, the Court recognized that the First
Amendment guarantees the free speech rights of high school students," that religious speech is afforded the same level of protec-

6. See infra notes 105-12 and accompanying text. The American Center for Law and
Justice (hereinafter ACLJ) was established in 1990 by former presidential candidate and
founder of the Christian Broadcasting Network, Pat Robertson. See David Bauman, Conservative Lawyers Argue Religious Free Speech Case, Gannett News Service, February 23,

1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. The stated purpose of the ACLJ is
"Christian advocacy and the promotion of pro-liberty, pro-life and pro-family causes."
Richard Willing, Mich. School Superintendent Studying Graduation Prayers, Gannet News

Service, June 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. In pursuit of
these goals, the ACLJ provides free legal services to Christians who feel that their constitutional rights have been violated and regularly challenges liberal advocacy groups such as
the American Civil Liberties Union (hereinafter ACLU). See Roy Rivenburg, Robertson
Lawyers Aid Conservative Christians, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, February 6, 1993, at 3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (describing some of the cases for which the
ACLJ is providing free legal services).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech.
...
).
8. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223
(1963) (banning the reading of the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the

start of each school day); Engel v. Vitale,
sponsored prayer at the start of each day).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating in part
an establishment of religion"). In Lemon v.
Court determined that, in order to survive

370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (banning schoolthat "Congress shall make no law respecting
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 612-13 (1971), the
an Establishment Clause challenge, a state

action: "[M]ust have a secular legislative purpose; .. . its principal or primary effect

must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; [and] finally, the statute must not
foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."' Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (citations omitted). Several Supreme Court
Justices have criticized this framework as "contrary to the long-range interests of the
country." Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissent-

ing); accord Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
10. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
("It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
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tion as other forms of speech," and that the Constitution forbids
government hostility toward religion. 2
The line of cases involving access to school facilities by religious groups began with the Supreme Court's decision in Widmar
v. Vincent, 3 wherein the Court determined that a public university
that allowed all student groups to meet on university property
could not exclude religious groups based upon the content of their
beliefs. 4 The University of Missouri at Kansas City had adopted
a policy forbidding student groups to use university facilities "for
purposes of religious worship or religious teaching."' 5 The Court
determined that the university's policy "discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a generally
open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion."' 6 The
Court also determined that, although the university may have a
compelling interest in complying with the Establishment Clause, an
argument which was also advanced by the school district in
Lamb's Chapel, "[ilt does not follow ... that an 'equal access'
policy would be incompatible [therewith]."'" Despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Widmar, the Federal Courts of Appeals began
striking down equal access policies under the Establishment
Clause. 8 For example, in Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Independent School District,9 the court struck down a policy
allowing student religious groups to use school facilities "on the
same basis as other groups."'2 These courts almost universally

freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
11. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
653 (1981) ("[N]onreligious organizations ...
are entitled to rights equal to those of
religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views . . . "').

12. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (stating that the Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any").

13. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
14. Id. at 277.
15. Id. at 265.
16. Id. at 269.

17. Id. at 271.
18. See, e.g., Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1045-46 (5th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing Widmar on the basis that university students
are less likely than younger students to equate equal access with an endorsement of religion), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980) (finding no equal access when the forum was a public high school and the
speech consisted of prayer meetings), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
19. 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
20. Id. at 1041.
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determined that "even the mere appearance of secular involvement
in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its
imprimatur on a particular religious creed. This symbolic inference
is too dangerous to permit."'" The Circuit Courts have also taken
the position that the Establishment Clause provided a compelling
governmental interest in thd exclusion of religious speakers from
the schools.22 In response to these decisions, Congress passed the
Equal Access Acts designed to curtail content-based restrictions
on student meetings within secondary schools. The Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Equal Access Act in Board of
Education v. Mergens,24 finding that "[tihe Establishment Clause
does not license government to treat religion and those who teach
and practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities."' s However, the Supreme Court also decided a number
of cases which have severely disadvantaged those seeking to express their religious views in the schools. For example, in Wallace
v. Jaffree,26 the Court struck down a statute requiring a moment
of silence at the beginning of the school day for the purpose of allowing students to meditate of pray on a voluntary basis.27
III.

THE LAMB'S CHAPEL DECISION

A.

Facts

The Center Moriches Union Free School District, located in
Suffolk County, New York, adopted a policy that opened its fa-

21. Brandon, 635 F.2d at 978: see also Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1045 ("[A]llowing reli-

gious meetings at a time closely associated with the beginning or end of the school day
implies recognition of religious activities and meetings as an integral part of the District's
extracurricular program and carries with it an implicit approval by school officials of
those programs.").
22. See Brandon, 635 F.2d at 980 ("While students have First Amendment rights to
political speech in public schools. [sic] sensitive Establishment Clause considerations limit
their right to air religious doctrines.") (citation omitted); cf. Lubbock, 669 F.2d at 1046
("[A]uthorization of voluntary meetings held before or after school . . . has the primary
effect of advancing religion,").
23. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1988) (declaring it unlawful for a public
secondary school, which receives federal funding and has a limited open forum, to deny
equal access to, or to discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
at that school on the basis of the religious content of the speech at such meetings).
24. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
25. Id. at 248.
26. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
27. Id. at 60.
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cilities to a wide variety of groups pursuant to New York state

law.' On November 19, 1988, Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical
Christian group, sought permission to use school facilities to conduct a Sunday morning worship service.29 Thereafter, on two separate occasions, Lamb's Chapel sought permission to use the
school facilities for the purpose of showing a five-part film series
containing lectures by Doctor James Dobson, described as a "Family oriented movie-from the Christian perspective."3 School officials denied each request stating that "[t]his film does appear to be
church related and therefore your request must be refused."3
B.

District Court Proceedings

Lamb's Chapel and its pastor John Steigerwald filed suit
against the school district in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that the school district's refusal to grant
permission to show the requested films violated their rights under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.32 On May 16, 1990, the

Court refused to grant Lamb's Chapel's request for a preliminary
injunction.33 Thereafter, on July 15, 1991, the District Court grant-

ed summary judgment in favor of the school district. ' The court
distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education
v. Mergens5 on the ground that Mergens was decided on the basis of the Equal Access Act, which granted rights only to students;
thus, "[n]either Congress nor the Supreme Court has seen fit to
require a school district to open its doors to nonstudents who wish

28. N. Y. EDuc. LAW § 414 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1993) (allowing schools to be
opened for a wide variety of purposes); see also Brief for Petitioners at 4-6, Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (No. 91-2024)
[Hereinafter Petitioner's Briej] (listing the various groups which had conducted activities
in school functions in Center Moriches and describing their activities). The statute and the
school district policy listed the permissible uses of school facilities by outside groups, but
religious activities were not included in this list.
29. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 92
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
30. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2145.
31. Id. at 2144-45.
32. Petitioner's Brief supra note 28, at 8-9.
33. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247,
1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
34. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp 91, 99
(E.D.N.Y. 1991), affd, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev'd. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
35. 496 U.S. 226 (1990). See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the
case).
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to use school facilities for the purpose of conducting religious
activities within a school. ' 36 The court then held that the schools

were neither traditional public fora nor designated public fora37
because the New York statute limited the permissible uses
school buildings. The court also determined that religious
could be excluded as a nonpermitted use "where a school
has not, by policy or practice, permitted a similar use
38

of the
speech
district
in the

past.

C.

The Second Circuit Opinion

On March 18, 1992, the Second Circuit affirmed the decision
of the District Court. 39 The court first determined that "the school
property in question falls within the subcategory of 'limited public

forum,' the classification that allows it to remain non-public except
as to specified uses."' Like the District Court, the court based its
conclusion on the fact that religious uses were not mentioned in
the applicable New York statute.4' The court then found that the

36. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98.:
37. Id. at 97-98. The Supreme Court has determined that the degree of protection given to speech by the First Amendment depends upon the type of forum in which the
speaker wishes to express his or her views. Generally, there are three types of fora for
purposes of First Amendment analysis. First, traditional public fora such as streets and
parks have "been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (plurality opinion);
see also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179 (1983) (overturning a ban on expressive activity outside the Supreme Court building). In traditional public fora. the government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech, provided the
restrictions "'are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."' Id. at 177 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
The second type of forum is known as a "designated public forum" and has been
defined as an area where a "[s]tate has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. In a designated public forum, the
state cannot exclude a class of speakers "even if it was not required to create the forum
in the first place." Id. Thus, as long as the forum is held open, traditional public forum
rules apply. Id. at 46.
Finally, in a nonpublic forum, speech can be regulated to a greater degree. The
Supreme Court has concluded that "control over access to a nonpublic forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Cornelius v.
NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
38. Lamb's Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98.
39. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.
1992), rev'd, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993).
40. Id. at 386.
41. Id. at 386-87.
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exclusion of Lamb's Chapel met the requirement of viewpoint
neutrality because the school district had not permitted any religious uses of school property that would amount to opening the
forum to religious speech.42 The Second Circuit agreed with the
lower court that "none of the prior uses pointed to by [Lamb's
Chapel] were for religious purposes."4 3 The court concluded that
"the facilities were limited forums not opened to religious uses by
policy or practice and there was no constitutional violation in the
failure of the School District to afford access to [Lamb's Chapel]." 4
D. The Supreme Court Decision
On June 7, 1993, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Second Circuit's decision.45 Writing for the Court, Justice White
began by rejecting the forum analysis applied by the lower courts
stating that "even if the courts below were correct in this respect-and we shall assume for present purposes that they
were-the judgment below must be reversed" because the exclusion
of Lamb's Chapel was not reasonable and viewpoint neutral* as
required by the Supreme Court's decision in Cornelius v.
NAACP.4 6 The Court rejected the lower courts' finding that the
exclusion was viewpoint neutral because their reasoning "does not
answer the critical question whether it discriminates on the basis of
viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation
of all views about family issues and child-rearing except those
dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint."'47 The
Court found no "indication in the record ... that the application
to exhibit the particular film involved here was or would have
been denied for any reason other than the fact that the presentation
would have been from a religious perspective." ' Thus, the denial
of access to Lamb's Chapel violated the First Amendment because
[a]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a non-public

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 388.
Id.
Id.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.. 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149

(1993).
46. Id. at 2147; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
770 F. Supp. 91, 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (setting forth the test from Cornelius v. NAACP,
473 U.S. 788, 866 (1985), regarding regulation in a non-public forum).
47. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
48. Id.
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forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed
within the purpose of the forum ..
or if he is not a
member of the class of speakers for whose special benefit
the forum was created ... the government violates the
First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely
to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise
includible subject.49
The Court also rejected the school district's claim that allowing
Lamb's Chapel to show the films would violate the Establishment
Clause. 0 The school district argued that a court-ordered policy of
unlimited access would violate the Establishment Clause because it
would be government advancement of religion.5' Calling the
school district's fears "unfounded," the Court stated that "there
would have been no realistic danger that the community would
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular
creed." 2 Thus, the Court held that the use of the school by
Lamb's Chapel met the standards of Lemon v. Kurtzman 3
The Court also summarily rejected the school district's argument that the exclusion of Lamb's Chapel, which the district
termed a "radical . . . religious organization,"' was justified because "it is sensible to anticipate that certain groups' use of facilities . .. would give rise to a volatile and destructive situation."55
The Court stated that "[t]here is nothing in the record to support
such a justification, which in any event would be difficult to defend."56 For these reasons the Court reversed the judgment of the
lower courts.5 7

49. Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
50. See Brief For Respondents at 27-30, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (No. 91-2024) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
51. Id. at 27; cf. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1064 (6th
Cir. 1987) (holding that accommodating Christianity in the schools violated the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that allowing equal
access to school facilities by Christian groups violated the Establishment Clause), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
52. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
53. Id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test).
54. Id. at 12.
55. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 50, at 4-5.
56. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
57. Id. at 2149. Two concurring opinions were filed, one by Justice Kennedy and one
written by Justice Scalia and joined by Justice Thomas. Id. Both of these opinions criticized the Court's use of the Lemon test to determine the issue of whether allowing

19931

LAMB'S CHAPEL v. CENTER MORICHES SCH DIST.

323

IV. ANALYSIS
The decision in Lamb's Chapel is significant for a number of
reasons. First, the Court extended the right of equal access to
school facilities beyond the provisions of the Equal Access Act and
placed these rights within the protection of the First Amendment."8
The Court also extended the right of equal access by granting first
amendment protection to private groups in addition to students.59
The Court's reasoning indicates that several lower court decisions
limiting the access of religious groups to school facilities should
now be decided differently. For example, in Berger v. Rensselaer
Central School Corp.,' the court decided that a school district
that allowed the Gideons to distribute Bibles to school children
under the district's equal access policy violated the Establishment
Clause because "expression may be stifled in the govern-ment's
vigilance to remain neutral toward religion."6 Holding the school
district's equal access policy unconstitutional, the court stated that
"[a] public school cannot sanitize an endorsement of religion forbidden under the Establishment Clause by also sponsoring nonreligious speech."6
In Doe v. Human,' the court determined that a school district
violated the Establishment Clause by allowing volunteers to enter
the schools to teach voluntary Bible classes for the purpose of
balancing the schools' endorsement of secular humanism.' In support of its holding, the court stated that "[e]ven if [the school
district [has] established one religion (secular humanism), such

Lamb's Chapel to utilize the school's facilities would violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 2149-50. Justice Scalia stated "I would hold, simply and clearly, that giving Lamb's
Chapel nondiscriminatory access to school facilities cannot violate that provision because it
does not signify state or local embrace of a particular religious sect." Id. at 2151 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
58. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) ("Because we hold that
petitioners have violated the [Equal Access] Act, we do not decide respondents claims
under the Free Speech [Clause].").
59. The Supreme Court's prior decisions addressing equal access issues all dealt exclusively with the rights of students. See, e.g., Mergens, 496 U.S. at 231-32; Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
60. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2344 (1993).
61. Id. at 1168.
62. Id.
63. 725 F. Supp. 1503 (W.D. Ark. 1989), aft'd, 923 F.2d 857 (8th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 922 (1991).
64. Id. at 1506.
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conduct does not allow them to establish a second (Christiani-

ty).

65

Lamb's Chapel also will help those students who seek to express their religious views in the public schools by expanding their
rights beyond the terms of the Equal Access Act and placing their
emphasis instead on the First Amendment. Applying the logic of
the Lamb's Chapel Court, numerous lower court decisions regarding the free speech rights of religious children are now of questionable validity. Especially dubious is the decision in Nartowicz v.
Clayton County School District,' wherein the court held that allowing meetings of a Christian student group violated the Establishment Clause.67 Similarly, in DeNooyer v. Livonia Public
Schools," the court upheld a school district's decision to prohibit
a second grade student from showing a videotape of herself singing
a Christian song during "show and tell" while allowing Jewish students to display menorahs and other religious symbols.69
Under Lamb's Chapel, the exclusion of each of these groups
and individuals based solely upon the religious content of their
messages is clearly unconstitutional. Justice White's majority opinion unequivocally states that "denial on that basis was plainly
invalid."70 As one commentator has stated, the First Amendment
grants religious bodies the right to "act as agents for transmitting
the operative values of society by formulating and articulating the
moral aspects of political questions."'" Thus, the Court's decision
opens the door to even greater free speech rights of Christians in
the public schools.72
65. Id. at 1508 n.2; see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058,
1065 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (noting that "[e]fforts to achieve
[balance in the school curriculum] would lead to a forbidden entanglement of the public
schools in religious matters"); James E. Wood, Jr., Religion and the Public Schools, 1986

B.Y.U. L. REV. 349, 356 (1986) (arguing that public schools must remain secular in their
teachings).
66. 736 F.2d 646 (1lth Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 649. In Gamett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 874 F.2d 608, 613 (9th Cir.
1989), vacated on other grounds, 496 U.S. 914 (1990), the Court determined that a
school district properly denied a Christian group permission to meet prior to the beginning
of the school day because "[tihe district's exclusion of religious groups from its
cocurricular program is not only reasonable, but also constitutionally required."
68. 799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 1 F.3d 1240 (6th Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 753-54.
70. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141. 2147
(1993).
71. Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Hostility to Religion, American Style, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
263, 285 (1992).
72. Even members of groups opposed to the decision in Lamb's Chapel, admit that the
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Additionally, the Court's holding that nondiscriminatory equal
access plans do not violate the Constitution should help to dispel
the notion that merely permitting religious speech is equivalent to
establishing an official religion.73 Professor Michael McConnell
stated that "I don't think people realize how common it is for
religious speakers to be suppressed in public schools. This decision
says public spaces will not be treated as religion-free zones."'74
One commentator has insightfully observed that "[plerhaps in a
totalitarian state the government implicitly endorses all that it does
not censor. But no such inference can be drawn in a nation with a
constitutional guarantee of free speech."75 However, a number of
courts have relied upon this reasoning to uphold the removal of
religious speakers from school facilities. For example, in Jager v.
Douglas County School District,6 the court ruled that an equal
access plan permitting various groups to give invocations prior to
high school football games violated the Establishment Clause stating that "invocations permitted by the equal access plan convey the
message that the state endorses religions believing in prayer."77 As
one commentator has stated, "[v]iewpoint discrimination does not
become any more palatable because it is used in conjunction with
' By disapproving a similar argument
the Establishment Clause."78
decision paves the way for greater protection of the free speech rights of religious speakers. See Sonya Live: God & School (CNN television broadcast, June 8, 1993), available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. (Lisa Thurau, acting chair of the New York State
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, referred to Lamb's Chapel as "just
the beginning, a foot in the door" and stated that "there's more to come after this").
73. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148 (asserting that using district property to
show a film on family values, where told from a religious standpoint, was not an establishment of religion under Lemon). A number of prior Court decisions had reached the
opposite result. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 600 (1989).
wherein the Supreme Court decided that allowing a private group to display a nativity
scene on government property "sends an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes . . . Christian praise to God." But cf Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ.,
827 F.2d 1058, 1065 (6th Cir.1987) (holding that the mere exposure to anti-religious
materials is permissible under the Constitution).
74. Max Boot, High Court Sends Signals on Church, State Issue, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 9, 1993, at 8, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (citation
omitted).
75. Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 14 (1986).
76. 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989).
77. Id. at 832; see also Joki v. Board of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 823, 831 (N.D.N.Y.
1990) (holding that a school district violated the Establishment Clause by refusing to
censor the display of student artwork containing religious images because such images
transmit a message of the endorsement of religion).
78. John W. Hamilton, Note, Bishop v. Aronov: Religion-Tainted Viewpoints are
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in Lamb's Chapel, the Court unquestionably has weakened similar
arguments that may arise in future cases.
By extending equal access rights to private speakers, the
Lamb's Chapel Court took an important step toward eliminating
bias against religion and toward a true policy of neutrality toward
religious speech.79 In recent years, courts and educators, in alliance with a number of liberal interest groups, have undertaken
extensive efforts to remove Christian ideas from the public
schools." For example, in Roberts v. Madigan,8 a teacher read
from his own Bible during silent reading periods and placed a
number of books discussing Christianity, Buddhism, Native American religions, and Greek gods and goddesses in his classroom
library.8" Under the auspices of the Establishment Clause, the
principal ordered the teacher to cease reading the Bible and to
remove only the books dealing with Christianity.83 The court up-

held the principal's actions on the ground that the teacher "substantially infringed on the rights of [his] students" by placing the
Christian books in the classroom. 8' Now that the Supreme Court

Banned From the Marketplace of Ideas, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1557, 1589 (1992).
79. See Laycock, supra note 75, at 14 ("[Plrotecting religious and antireligious speech
equally with secular speech is far more neutral than singling out religious and antireligious speech for special treatment.").
If the Establishment Clause means that anything that receives public funds must
be devoid of religion, then given the ever expanding role of the government in
education, the religious principles upon which our country was founded will be
excluded unfairly from the academic forum. This application of the Establishment Clause is not religion-neutral, it is anti-religion.
Hamilton, supra note 78 at 1590.
80. For example, in New York City, "dozens of Long Island organizations" held a
series of workshops for the purpose of preventing members of The Christian Coalition
from holding positions on local school boards. Roni Rabin, Challenging the Religious
Right: Aim to "out" Christian Coalition, NEWSDAY, May 21, 1993 at 25, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File; see also Gerald V. Bradley, Protecting Religious
Liberty: Judicial and Legislative Responsibilities, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 253, 257 (1992)
(stating that as judicially interpreted from 1947 until very recently, "the.First Amendment
was hostile to all religion that was not privatized"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 134 (1992) ("The Religion Clause
jurisprudence of the Warren and Burger era was . . .characterized by a hostility or indifference to religion, manifested in a weak application of free exercise doctrine and an
aggressive application of an establishment doctrine systematically weighted in favor of the
secular and against genuine religious pluralism.").
81. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992).
82. Id. at 1049, 1055.
83. Id. at 1055.
84. Id. at 1058.
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has granted religious groups a constitutional right of equal treatment, this bias may soon come to an end.
In Abington School District v. Schempp,"5 Justice Goldberg, in
a concurring opinion, warned that judicial overreliance on the principle of religious neutrality could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or even active, hostility
to the religious." 6 However, judges have not heeded Justice
Goldberg's warning and have often expressed open hostility toward
religion. One of the most common arguments advanced by judges
and legal commentators is that religious individuals are intolerant
of opposing viewpoints; therefore, they wish to indoctrinate others
in their beliefs for the purpose of obtaining power over society."
For example, in Board of Education v. Allen,8 the Court upheld a
program allowing a public school to loan books to religious
schools.8 9 In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black stated that the law
allowing the loan program was passed by "sectarian religious propagandists who have succeeded in securing passage of the present
law to help religious schools carry on their sectarian religious
purposes [and who] can and doubtless will continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination and supremacy of their
particular brand of religion."' Another federal judge wrote that a
group of students who opposed the teaching of evolution on religious grounds were "totalitarian" and wished to engage in "bookburning."'" One commentator has suggested that when faced with
competing beliefs or ideas inconsistent with their own, religious
individuals may engage in "intolerance, repression, hate, and persecution."'92 As a result, "the erection of a presumptive barrier
85. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
86. Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J.,concurring); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
judges send "a clear message of disapproval [of religion]" when they act as "jealous
guardians of an absolute 'wall of separation' [between religion and government]");
Gaffney, supra note 71, at 293 ("[C]omplete indifference to religion on the part of government is just a lethal to religious freedom [as official hostility]").

87. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1068-69 (6th Cir.
1989) (characterizing Christians as intolerant), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
88. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
89. Id. at 248.
90. Id. at 251 (Black, J.,dissenting).
91. Wright v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
aft'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974); see also Deeper
Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of Educ., 852 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating
that a church desiring to conduct services in a school auditorium while the church was
renovated were seeking "a forum for proselytizing or indoctrinating the public").
92. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGs L. J. 843, 858
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against religious participation in the public square is defensible."93
In addition to characterizing religious speakers in an improper
light, some judges have engaged in outright bigotry against certain
religions.' For example, in the case on Lemon v. Kurtzman,95 in
his concerning opinion Justice Douglas cited a book that has been
labeled by one commentator as "one of the most notorious antiCatholic polemical tracts of recent times."96 The work cited by
Justice Douglas recommends that Catholics be forbidden from
holding public office and stated that parochial schools are "taught
by ignorant European peasants" and produce "an undue proportion
of the gangsters, racketeers, thieves, and juvenile delinquents who
roam our big city streets."97
Lower federal courts have also practiced a great deal of antireligious bigotry. For example, in Grove v. Mead School District
No. 354,9" the court upheld the inclusion in the public school curriculum of a book containing threats to "blow the ass off Jesus
Christ, the long-legged white son-of-a-bitch" and referring to God
as "a poor white trash God."" Going further, the court stated that
accommodation of the wishes of Christians posed a "critical threat
to public education."" Finally, in Berger v. Rensselaer Central
School Corp.,"° the court felt that allowing the Gideons access to
the schools was a more serious constitutional violation than allowing a Rabbi to lead a graduation prayer because the Gideons'
views were "Christian."' 0 2
The school district in Lamb's Chapel made a similar argument
based upon the premise that religious groups are so intolerant that

(1993). Professor Marshall also refers to religion as "dogmatic," "authoritarian." and
"frightening." Id. at 852, 853.
93. Id. at 863.
94. See generally McConnell, supra note 80, at 121-22 (accusing Justice Black of
"bigotry"); Gaffney, supra note 71, at 279-83 (tracing the history of judicial prejudice
against Catholics).
95. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
96. Gaffney, supra note 71, at 282; see also Douglas Laycock. Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, 54 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 390, 419 (1977) (stating that Justice Douglas cited "an
elaborate hate tract"). Justice Douglas cited LORAINE BOETTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM
(1962), quoted in Lemon, 403 U.S. at 636 (Douglas, J.,concurring).
97. Laycock, supra note 96, at 419 (quoting LORAINE BOEMTNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM
420, 371, 370 (1962)).
98. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985).
99. Id. at 1547-49 (appendix to case).
100. Id. at 1534.
101. 982 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2344 (1993).
102. Id. at 1170.
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violence and unrest would necessarily follow their inclusion in the
school building. 3 By rejecting this argument outright and stating
that such a contention, even if proven "would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the presentation of a religious point of
view,"' 1 the Supreme Court sent a message that such unfounded
stereotypes cannot be used to exclude religious speech from the
public schools.
The final effect of the decision in Lamb's Chapel is the enhancement of the stature of Christian advocacy groups, most notably the American Center for Law. and Justice (ACLJ),0 5 which
represented Lamb's Chapel and its pastor, John Steigerwald, who
continue their efforts to enhance the equal access rights of religious
speakers. The Supreme Court's ruling was hailed by Christian
Right groups as a "major victory."'" Another source credited the
ACLJ with "finding clever new legal pathways back into the
schools" and securing "'equal access to the marketplace of ideas
for religious people.""' 7
The victory in Lamb's Chapel has given both publicity and
credibility to the ACLJ and is sure to increase its bargaining power
with local school officials who seek to restrict the access of religious speakers to school facilities. Patterning its activities after
those of legal advocacy groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union,0" the ACLJ employs what has been referred to as a
"blackmail and bludgeon" approach, often writing letters to local
officials who, in the opinion of the ACLJ, are violating the first
amendment rights of religious individuals explaining the obligations
of the schools under the law and threatening litigation if the offi-

103. Respondents Brief. supra note 50, at 4-5, 11-12; cf. May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh
Sch. Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1109 (7th Cir. 1986) (speculating that a group of teachers
conducting prayer meetings prior to the start of the school day would lead to "the destruction of the school's peaceful atmosphere").
104. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. CL. at 2148.
105. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (tracing the history of the ACLJ).
106. Boot, supra note 74, at 8; accord Don Lattin, Religious Groups Favored in Two
High Court Cases; One Allows Some Student Prayers in School, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLF, June 8, 1993, at Al, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (hailing
the case as a victory for Pat Robertson, founder of the ACLJ).
107. Tom Teepen, Religious Right is Back in Class, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., June 20,
1993, at 5, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (quoting Jay Sekulow, chief
counsel for the ACLJ).
108. See Roy Rivenburg, Litigating for a 'Godly Heritage'; Law: Pat Robertson's
Group of Lawyers Provides Free Help to Consen'ative Christians. It Hasn't Lost a Case
in Two Years, Los ANGELES TIMEs, December 30, 1992, at El, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Current File.
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cials fail to fulfill their obligations." ° The Court's unanimous decision in Lamb's Chapel will help the ACLJ to follow the advice
of one commentator and "create an impression that they are a
source to be reckoned with so that school administrators will think
twice about fighting them."" The decision in Lamb's Chapel
provides a powerful weapon to the ACLJ as it attempts to end discrimination against religious speech at the local level.
The ACLJ has already used this tactic successfully in a number
of instances. For example, the Clark County, Nevada School Board
overruled a principal's decision to prohibit a student from singing a
Christian song during a Christmas program after the ACLJ threatened to sue."' Additionally, a number of schools changed their
policies after the ACLJ has sent letters to hundreds of school districts advising them that student-initiated prayers at graduations
must be allowed."' The publicity generated by the unanimous
decision in Lamb's Chapel will undoubtedly increase the pressure
that the ACLJ is able to bring against school officials who seek to
deny religious speakers their free speech rights and will make such
efforts more successful in the future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel was a significant victory, for religious speakers seeking access to the public
schools. By extending the right of equal access to private speakers
and holding that such rights are guaranteed by the Constitution as
well as by the Equal Access Act, the Court presented Christians
with a powerful weapon to overcome their exclusion from the
public schools based solely upon their beliefs. In Shumway v. Albany County School District No. One,' the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming held that Lamb's Chapel prevented a school board from changing its equal access policy for
the purpose of excluding a group of students and parents who
sought permission to conduct a baccalaureate ceremony in the high

109. John G. West, Jr. The Changing Battle Over Religion in the Public Schools, 26
WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 361, 400-01 (1991) (explaining the ACLU's approach).
110. Id. at 401.
111. Larry Witham, Christian Group Fights Under Free Speech Flag, WASHINGTON
TIMES, December 22, 1992, at A3, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
112. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Loudon Second-Guesses High Court in Prayer
Vote: Students May Pray at Graduation Ceremonies, WASH. POST, May 4, 1993, at B3.
113. 826 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo. 1993).
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school auditorium." 4 The court stated that the school board "singled out the baccalaureate parent/student group in a discriminatory
manner which significantly impacted the first amendment rights of
group members."".. Thus, the court's extension of the equal access principle is already having an impact on the outcome of litigation.
Although it remains to be seen how the Court will treat future
equal access cases, the new weapons given to the ACLJ and similar groups by the Lamb's Chapel decision indicate that the rights
of religious speakers will be more vigorously enforced in the future.
MICHAEL D. BAKER

114. Id. at 1325-26.
115. Id. at 1325.

